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Abstract 
Concentration of ownership in Malaysian public listed companies contributes to agency conflict between 
majority and minority shareholders. An effective monitoring mechanism is critical to mitigate this conflict. The 
study aims to examine the influence of board and audit committee independence, internal audit function and 
ownership concentration on earnings quality proxied by discretionary accruals. The sample of the study 508 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia Main Market from 2009 to 2012. Two measures of discretionary 
accruals are used: Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995); and extended Modified Jones Model (Yoon et 
al., 2006). Using OLS regression, results of the study suggest that audit committee independence and more 
investment in internal audit function are related to higher earnings quality. However, board of directors’ 
independence and ownership concentration are associated with lower earnings quality. The finding indicates the 
importance of audit committee independence in producing quality financial reporting. Consistent findings are 
found for most variables in both models. The findings of the study have implication on the use of measurement 
of discretionary accruals in earnings quality studies and corporate governance practices in Malaysia. 
Keywords: board independence, audit committee, internal audit function, ownership concentration, 
discretionary accruals, earnings quality, Malaysia 
1. Introduction 
The main objective of organizations is to ensure customers, investors, creditors, suppliers, regulators and the 
public at large that they are operating responsibly towards more accurate financial information (Abdullah, 1999). 
This can be achieved through gaining the confidence of all parties to invest in the businesses. Evidence from the 
financial crisis in 1997 has shown the effect of poor corporate governance and lack of transparency in financial 
reporting. Good corporate governance practices and transparency of financial reporting can enhance the 
investors’ confidence (Hashim, 2007).  
Concerns about the earnings management relationship with the recent high-profile scandals in accounting have 
caused the investing community to demand for higher earnings quality for the purpose of enhancing the financial 
statements quality (Bedard & Johnstone, 2004). Discretionary accruals have received much attention among 
academics as well as investors as an important indicator of earnings quality.  
The agency theory and resource dependence theory draw attention to the importance of directors’ independence 
in monitoring the management’s activities (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2007). The independence 
of the board of directors and audit committee from the management can reduce uncertainty about the quality of 
financial reporting as a result of improved flow of information between the firms and stakeholders. Also, more 
investment in internal audit function increase the internal control of reported earnings process and increase the 
integrity of financial reporting quality (Al-Shetwi, Ramadili, Chowdury, & Sori, 2011; Prawitt, Smith, & Wood). 
From the agency theory perspective, ownership concentration might lead to conflict of interests between the 
majority and minority shareholders, whereby the majority shareholders tend to expropriate the firm’s resources 
(Porta, Lopez‐De‐Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
Based on the above discussion, we examine the association between the independence of board of directors and 
audit committee, internal audit function and ownership concentration and earnings quality. This study extends 
the prior literature in several ways. First, this study is the first study to apply the extended modified Jones model 
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of discretionary accruals by Yoon et al. (2006) to measure earnings quality in Malaysian Main Market listed 
companies. Second, this study examines the effectiveness of directors’ independence and internal audit function 
on earnings quality after the implementation of the revised Code on Corporate Governance, 2007. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Board of Directors’ Independence 
Board independence is the basic reason behind the board’s monitoring mechanism that is geared to monitor 
management’s actions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that non-executive directors 
may mitigate the agency problems stemming from the management’s self-serving behaviours. Empirical 
evidence has shown that independent directors have negative relationship with discretionary accruals (Abdullah 
& Nasir, 2004; Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Bekiris & Doukakis, 2011; Klein, 2002; Park & Shin, 2004; Salehet 
al., 2005). This in turn results in high governance monitoring, leading to improving financial reporting quality. 
This indicates that independent directors lead to high corporate governance effectiveness. 
Furthermore, Koh, Laplante and Tong’s (2007) study of Australian firms and Benkraiem’s (2009) of French 
firms has highlighted the significant role of independent board of directors in minimizing earnings management. 
Along the same line, a study conducted by Beekes, Pope and Young (2004) in the U.K. and by Ahmed and 
Duellman (2007) in the U.S., also supported that high proportion of independent directors in the board is related 
to high degree of authentic accounting and high earnings quality. In addition, most empirical studies on earnings 
quality have found that directors’ independence is a signal of corporate governance effectiveness and enhanced 
quality of earnings (Hunton et al., 2011; Siagian & Tresnaningsih, 2011).  
Some studies have shown that high percentage of external directors on the board is effective in limiting earnings 
management (Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2000) and the level of erroneous financial reporting (Beasley, 1996). 
The Code on Corporate Governance (2001) in Malaysia emphasizes that the composition of independent 
directors on the board should be at least one third, which is aimed to warrant board independence from any 
dominant group of members (MCCG, 2001). In the revised Code on Corporate Governance (2012), the tenure of 
the non-executive directors on the board is an area of concern because over a longer period, the independent 
judgment of the non-executive directors may be diminished because they are bonded to the insiders, making 
them more sympathetic, or having interests closely aligned with the insiders.  
Empirical studies in the context of Malaysia have provided inconsistent findings. Kamardin and Haron (2011) 
found that independent directors are not significantly related to the monitoring roles of board of directors. 
Abdullah and Nasir (2004); Mohamad, et al. (2012) and Buniamin, et al. (2012) showed no influence of 
independent directors on a firm’s earnings quality. Abdullah (2006) revealed that non-executive directors are 
effective during the financial crisis because investors expect firms to produce financial reports in a timely 
manner. In addition, Saleh et al. (2005) reported that higher proportion of independent directors cannot limit 
earnings management. Following the agency theory, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Board of directors’ independence is negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
2.2 Audit Committee Independence 
The audit committee is responsible for the evaluation of the integrity of the internal monitoring and risk 
management system of the company (MCCG, 2001). The audit committee should ensure financial statements 
comply with applicable financial reporting standards (MCCG, 2012). The agency and resource dependence 
theories argue that audit committee independence reduces discretionary accruals and enhances the quality of 
earnings. Several studies that have examined audit committee independence and earnings manipulations support 
the role of the audit committee. Klein (2002) showed that independence of audit committee is negatively related 
to abnormal accruals and reduced independence leads to increased abnormal accruals. Studies by Yang and 
Krishnan (2005); and Mohamed Yunos (2011) have revealed a significantly negative association between 
independence of audit committee and discretionary accruals. Similarly, Bradbury et al.(2006); Garcia, Barbadillo 
and Perez (2012); and Salleh, and Haat, (2014) reported that audit committee independence is related to higher 
earnings quality. Other studies have also found positive association between independent audit committee and 
earnings quality and the quality of financial reporting (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin, 
2010; Bedard & Johnstone, 2004; Bradbury et al., 2006; Klein, 2002; Siagian & Tresnaningsih, 2011).  
Empirical studies in the context of Malaysia have revealed mixed results on the relationship between audit 
committee independence and earnings quality. Saleh et al. (2007); Salleh, and Haat, (2014); and Mansor et al. 
(2013) reported that audit committee independence is related to the mitigation of discretionary accruals (proxy of 
earnings quality). Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) did not find significant relationship between audit committee 
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independence and discretionary accruals. However, Ameer, Ramli and Zakaria (2010) reported that performance 
of Malaysian firms is better when their audit committee is independent from management. Based on the agency 
and resource dependence theories, we hypothesize that: 
H2: Audit committee independence is negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
2.3 Investment in Internal Audit Function 
According to the agency theory, an increase in the internal control system could lead to an increase in the 
monitoring process of the company to reinforce and increase the financial information outcomes (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Internal audit function has become a crucial internal monitoring mechanism in corporate 
governance (Al-Shetwi, Ramadili, Chowdury, & Sori, 2011). Prawitt, Smith and Wood (2009) argue that internal 
audit function is relatively well funded has a greater monitoring ability to detect and deter material 
misstatements. Increased resources enable the internal audit department to hire and retain more competent 
personnel. 
The MCCG 2007 supports the roles and responsibilities of the internal audit function. The board should set up an 
internal audit function, which is directly accountable to the audit committee, to recognize and manage risks. 
Investment in the internal audit function implies more competent internal audit function personnel can help 
management to establish stronger controls over financial reporting, thus reducing the existence of control 
problems (Lin, Pizzini, Vargus, & Bardhan, 2011). Yasin and Nelson (2012) find a positive relationship between 
external audit quality and cost of internal audit function. Further, Prawitt et al. (2009) find a significant 
association between internal audit function and absolute abnormal accruals. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H3: Investment in internal audit function is negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
2.4 Ownership Concentration 
Porta et al. (1999) suggested that the conflict between majority and minority shareholders exists due to the 
agency problem created by ownership concentration. High ownership concentration provides opportunity to 
majority shareholders to use the firm's resources at the expense of the minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986). Fan and Wong (2002) reported that ownership concentration is related to low earnings quality. Yunos et 
al.(2010) found that ownership concentration is associated with lower accounting conservatism. Abdullah and 
Nasir (2004); and Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006) provided evidence that in the context of Malaysia, 
board independence is not significantly related to earnings management due to the high ownership concentration 
in Malaysian companies. Another study by Kamardin and Haron (2011) has suggested that high ownership 
concentration in Malaysian companies (which are mostly family firms) would result in effective monitoring 
mechanisms in which the interests of the majority shareholders are in line with the interests of the minority 
shareholders. Based on the above, we hypothesize that: 
H4: Ownership concentration is positively associated with discretionary accruals 
3. Method 
A total of 822 companies were listed on the Main Market of Bursa (Bourse) Malaysia in the year 2012. In 
determining the sample for this study, we excluded 51 financial related companies and unit trusts (Yatim, Kent, & 
Clarkson, 2006; Yunos et al., 2010); 123 companies having incomplete online annual reports for the period 
between 2009 and 2012; and 140 companies which had missing data related to the study’s variables. The final 
sample of the study is 508 companies. The period of study is four years (from 2009 to 2012) which resulted in 
2,032 firm observations among seven industries (Construction, Consumer, Industrial Product, Plantation, 
Properties, Technology, Trading and Services). Data was obtained from the annual reports and database.  
3.1 Measurements of Discretionary Accruals 
Previous studies have used discretionary accruals to proxy earnings quality. Two measurements of discretionary 
accruals are used in this study to see whether the results are consistent for all the models. The first measurement 
(DA1) follows the Modified Jones Model by Dechow et al. (1995) which has been used in previous studies. 
Ordinary-Least Square (OLS) cross-sectional regression for all study years and industries are used to estimate the 
fitted values (coefficients of a1, a2, and a3). The model’s equation is as follows:  
ACCit /TAit-1 = a0 + a1 (1 / TAit-1) + a2 (ΔREVit - ΔRECit /TAit-1) + a3 (PPEit /T Ait-1) + eit     (1) 
Where: 
ACCit = total accruals measured by net income – cash flows from operations 
TAit-1 = prior total assets 
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ΔREVit = change in sales/revenue 
ΔRECit = change in trade receivables 
PPEit = property, plant and equipment 
eit= error term 
i = industry 
t = year 
Following Dechow et al. (1995), the change in accounts receivable is deducted from the change in revenues 
before estimation. Then, the industry- and year-specific is used to estimate the parameter estimates (coefficients 
a0; a1; a2; and a3) to infer non-discretionary accruals (NDA) as in equation (2): 
NDAit = a0 + a1 (1 / TAit-1) + a2 (ΔREVit - ΔRECit /TAit-1) + a3 (PPEit /T Ait-1)        (2) 
The difference between estimation (standardized residuals) in equation (2) and actual accruals represents the 
total discretionary accruals in the following equation: 
DAit =ACCit - NDAit                                                   (3) 
Where:  
NDAit = non-discretionary accruals 
DAit = discretionary accruals from the residuals estimated in model (1) 
The second measurement of discretionary accruals (DA2) follows the extended Modified Jones Model by Yoon 
et al. (2006). Studies in Korea by Yoon and Miller (2002); and Yoon et al. (2006); and a study in Bangladesh by 
Aminul Islam et al. (2011) have found that the Modified Jones Model by Dechow et al. (1995) does not robust 
for Asian companies. The model is described in equation (4): 
ACCit/REVit=β0+ β1 (ΔREVit– ΔRECit)/ REVit + β2 (Δ EXPit – ΔPAYit) / REVit + β3 (DEPit + RETit) / REVit + eit 
(4) 
Where: 
ΔEXPit = change in sum of cost of goods sold and general administrative expenses excluding non-cash expenses 
ΔPAYit = change in accounts payable 
DEPit = depreciation expenses 
RETit = retirement benefits expenses 
Yoon et al.’s (2006) model proposes that the total accruals is related to changes in the cash revenue/sales, change 
of cash expenses and non-cash expenses of depreciation expenses and the expenses of retirement benefits. 
Discretionary accruals are accruals minus non-discretionary accruals for each observation as follows: 
DAit=TAit/ REVit– [β0+ β1 (ΔREVit– ΔRECit)/ REVit + β2 (Δ EXPit – ΔPAYit) / REVit + β3 (DEPit + RETit)/ REVit] 
(5) 
Then the absolute value of discretionary accruals |DA| represents earnings management because the earnings 
management can be income-increasing or income-decreasing accruals. Bedard et al. (2004); Klein (2002); Abdul 
Rahman and Ali (2006); and Prawitt et al. (2009) have suggested that the absolute value of abnormal accruals is 
a good proxy for the combined effect of income increasing and income decreasing earnings management. Thus, 
the high absolute value of discretionary accruals indicates low earnings quality and vice versa. 
3.2 Discretionary Accruals Model Specification 
Specifically, this study attempts to examine the relationship between board independence, audit committee 
independence, internal audit function and ownership concentration and earnings quality. The control variables 
related to discretionary accruals in previous studies, such as audit quality, profitability, leverage, firm size, net 
income loss and sales growth are included. The model used to achieve these objectives is as follows: 
|DA| = β0 + β1BDIND + β2ACIND + β3 IAF + β4 OWCO+ β5 BIG4+β6 ROA + β7 LEV+ β8 FSIZE + β9 LOSS + 
β10 Growth + ε 
Where: 
|DA| = absolute value of discretionary accruals 
BDIND = board of directors’ independence 
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ACIND = audit committee independence 
IAF = internal audit function 
OWCO = ownership concentration 
BIG4 = big 4 audit firms 
ROA = return on assets 
LEV = leverage 
FSIZE = firm size 
LOSS = net income loss 
SGROWTH = sales growth 
Table 1 provides a summary of measurements of the study’s variables. 
 
Table 1. Summary of measurements of study variables  
Variables Measurement 
BDIND Percentage of total number of independent non-executive members divided by the total number of board members 
(Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Mohamad et al., 2012).  
ACIND  Percentage of total number of independent non-executive members divided by the total number of AC members 
(Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Mohamad et al., 2012).  
IAF The natural log of internal audit cost (Johl, et al., 2013). 
BIG4 Equals “1” if the firm is audited by Big4 Auditors; and “0” otherwise (Abdul Rahman & Ali 2006; Davidson et 
al., 2005).  
OWCO Largest five shareholders (Gedajlovic & Shapiro 2002). 
ROA The annual net profit of individual firm before tax divided by total assets (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Ismail et 
al., 2010).  
LEV The ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Klein 2002; Davidson et al., 2005). 
FSIZE Natural log of total assets (Ismail et al., 2010; Peasnell et al., 2005; Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006). 
LOSS Dummy variable equal to “1” if the net income is less than zero and “0” otherwise (Dechow et al., 2003). 
SGROWTH Sales growth, annual sales growth (current year sales – prior year’s sales)/prior year’s sales (Ahmed et al., 2002). 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics and Analysis 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of continuous variables 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
DA1 0.002 0.195 0.056 0.050 1.266 4.028 
DA2 0.007 1.452 0.256 0.338 2.258 7.801 
BDIND 0.250 0.800 0.451 0.121 0.748 3.193 
ACIND 0.667 1.000 0.885 0.150 -0.581 1.423 
IAF 8.923 15.607 11.406 1.351 0.808 3.433 
OWCO 17.850 85.730 54.241 15.735 -0.147 2.415 
ROA -0.320 0.265 0.034 0.093 -0.892 6.647 
LEV 0.004 1.652 0.391 0.220 0.997 5.710 
FSIZE (log) 10.402 17.453 12.897 1.440 0.863 3.692 
SGROWTH -0.593 1.581 0.071 0.337 1.818 9.254 
 
Descriptive statistics of continuous variables and dichotomous variables are presented in Table 2 and Table 3, 
respectively. Table 2 shows that the average board of directors’ independence (BDIND) is 45% with the lowest 
of 25% and highest of 80%. It indicates that most companies have complied with the recommendations of the 
Code on Corporate Governance in Malaysia to have at least one third of the board comprising independent 
directors, consistent with finding in Yunos et al. (2010). The average percentage of audit committee members 
being independent directors (ACIND) is 88%, with the minimum of 67% and maximum of 100% which 
complies with the MCCG Code to have majority of independent directors. The average investment on internal 
audit function (IAF) is 11.41 (RM370,658) with the minimum value being8.92 (RM3,000) and the maximum 
value being15.61 (RM39,000,000). These results indicate that there is a concerted effort towards investment in 
internal audit function to increase earnings quality and to enhance the quality of financial reporting in Malaysian 
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Main Market listed companies. The average concentrated ownership is 54.24% with the minimum of 17% and 
maximum of 85.73% which indicates that shares owned by the largest five shareholders on the Malaysia Main 
Market companies are high. The size of the companies (FSIZE) varies with a minimum of 10.4 and a maximum 
of 17.45. The average leverage (LEV) is 0.39 and ROA of 0.034 (or 3.4%). The average sales growth 
(SGROWTH) of the study sample is 7%. 
Table 3 shows that 1,135 firms (55.9%) were audited by Big4 and 897 firms (44.1) by non-Big 4. This result 
indicates that most Malaysian listed companies on the Main Market have high quality of external audit which is 
expected to increase earnings quality.In addition, 21.5% of the sample companies have net income less than zero 
(LOSS).  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of dichotomous variables 
Variables Obs. 
Frequency Percent 
1 0 1 0 
BIG4 2032 1135 897 55.90% 44.10% 
LOSS 2032 438 1,594 21.60% 78.40% 
 
4.1 Diagnostic Test 
Following previous studies (e.g., Saleh et al., 2005; Yoon et al., 2006; Ball & Shavikumar, 2005; Kraft et al., 
2014; Bonetti et al., 2013; Gaio, 2010; Kothari et al., 2005; Prawittet et al., 2009), winsorized distribution was 
conducted to eliminate possible outliers in all continuous variables at the top and bottom one percent of the data 
distribution to maintain the characteristics of original data. Robust standard errors were conducted to estimate 
the regression models to solve heteroskedasticity problem. Skewness and kurtosis were used to test the normality 
assumption; for Skewness, Leys et al. (2013) and Hair et al. (2006) suggested a higher threshold of ±3; for kurtosis, 
Kline (1998) suggested a higher threshold of ±10. However, the results from this approach (see Table 4) have led 
to the conclusion that the data set has no serious violation of the normality assumption; therefore, it is assumed that 
the data are normally distributed. The correlation matrix between variables using Pearson correlation was 
conducted to test the multicollinearity issue. As presented in the table, no correlation of more than 0.80 exits (Hair 
et al., 2006), thus multicollinearity is not an issue in this study.  
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix of variables 
# Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 DA1 1 
2 DA2 0.25*** 1 
3 BDIND 0.04 0.18 1 
4 ACIND -0.03 0.03 0.40*** 1 
5 IAF -0.09 -0.89 -0.002 -0.006 1 
6 OWCO 0.02 0.03 -0.1 -0.11 0.12 1 
7 BIG4 -0.11 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.32*** 0.15* 
8 ROA -0.16** -0.17** -0.07 -0.01 0.16** 0.16** 
9 LEV 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.11 -0.14* 
10 FSIZE -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.76*** 0.11 
11 LOSS 0.15* 0.16** 0.09 0.04 -0.17** -0.13 
12 SGROWTH 0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.0007 
# Variables 7 8 9 10 11 12
7 BIG4 1 
8 ROA 0.18** 1 
9 LEV -0.13 -0.34*** 1 
10 FSIZE 0.35*** 0.18** 0.18** 1 
11 LOSS -0.16** -0.70*** 0.27*** -0.22*** 1 
12 SGROWTH 0.01 0.19** 0.04 0.07 -0.17** 1 
Note: *, **, ***, significant level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. DA1 = Discretionary accruals Modified Jones Model 
(Dechow et al., 1995), DA2 = extended Modified Jones Model (Yoon et al., 2006), BDIND = board independence, ACIND 
= AC independence, IAF = cost of internal audit function, BIG4 = largest 4 audit firms, OWCO = Ownership 
Concentration, ROA = Return on assets, LEV = Leverage, FSIZE = Firm size, LOSS = Net Income Loss, SGROWTH = 
Sales Growth. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Table 7 presents results of the regression analysis. The result shows that the BDIND is significant and positively 
associated in both models (DA1 and DA2). The result does not support the agency theory and resource 
dependence theory which suggest that board independence is a monitoring tool to enhance financial reporting 
quality. This finding contrasts previous studies (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Davidson et al., 2005; Chen et al., 
2007) which have found that board independence is related to high earnings quality. Thus, H1 is rejected. The 
possible explanation for these results is that the board of directors delegates the responsibility of financial monitoring to 
the audit committee, which is responsible for reporting the financial status of the corporation (McMullen, 1996; Beasley et 
al., 2009). 
In terms of audit committee independence, the result indicates that ACIND is significant with a negative 
direction with DA1. Thus, H2 is supported. This result concurs with the agency and resource dependence theories 
that more independent directors can enhance the monitoring role and bring more resources (expertise and 
experience) from outside directors which lead to high earnings and financial reporting quality. This result is 
similar to previous studies done by Klein (2002); Davidson et al. (2005); Saleh et al. (2007); Mansor, et al. 
(2013); and Salleh, and Haat, (2014). However, the result shows an insignificant association between ACIND 
and DA2. This result is not consistent with the agency and resource dependence theories’ argument that outside 
directors bring more expertise to enhance the monitoring device in firms and increase the quality of earnings. 
The insignificant relationship finding is similar to previous findings by Xie et al. (2003); Baxter and Cotter 
(2009); Garcia et al. (2012); Adiguzel (2013); Abdullah and Nasir (2004); and Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006).  
The cost of internal audit function (IAF) is insignificant with DA1 but significant and negatively related to DA2 
at the 1% level. This finding somehow indicates that increasing the cost of IAF would increase internal 
monitoring by reducing the earnings management and lead to higher earnings quality. This result supports 
increasing investment in internal audit function as a source to enhance internal monitoring. 
The relationship between ownership concentrations (OWCO) is found to be significant with a positive 
association between OWCO (five largest shareholders) and DA1and DA2; thus, H3 is supported. The findings 
support the agency theory by high ownership concentration producing high discretionary accruals (or low 
earnings quality). This finding is consistent with the finding of Fan and Wong (2002). Thus, effective monitoring 
mechanisms are required in firms with high concentrated ownership. 
In relation to the control variables, the result shows that Big4 audit firms have a significant and negative 
relationship with both discretionary accruals (DA1 and DA2). The result supports the role of audit quality in 
providing high earnings quality. This result is similar to Becker et al. (1998); Francis et al. (1999); Krishnan 
(2003); and Chi et al. (2011). 
ROA is found to be significant with a negative direction with both discretionary accruals measurements (DA1 
and DA2). Thus, the current study finds that firm performance is positively related to earnings quality. This 
finding is consistent with Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) who argued that firms with low performance have the 
tendency to be involved in earnings management. 
Meanwhile, leverage (LEV) is found to have a significant and positive relationship with DA1 which indicates 
that higher leveraged firms are more motivated to engage in earnings manipulation in order to avoid debt 
covenant violation. In other words, higher leverage leads to a higher level of earnings manipulation. This result 
is consistent with Klein (2002); and Davidson et al. (2005) who showed that leverage has a significantly positive 
relationship with earnings management activities; while there is an insignificant relationship between LEV and 
DA2. This result is similar to previous studies done by Nelson & Devi (2013); and Abdul Rahman & Ali (2006).  
Firm size (FSIZE) is found to have a significant and negative association with DA1. This result indicates that a 
large firm reports higher quality of earnings because the financial reporting process is monitored (Yusof et al., 
2010; Abdul Rahman & Ali., 2006; Saleh et al., 2005; Saleh et al., 2007; Mansor et al., 2013). However, the 
relationship with DA2 is insignificant with positive relationship. The positive result indicates that the large firms 
report low earnings quality (high discretionary accruals) which is consistent with results by Johl et al. (2013); 
and Bekiris and Doukakis (2011).  
In relation to LOSS, the result shows significant and positive association with both discretionary accruals 
measurements (DA1 and DA2). This result indicates that firms with loss net income have more earnings 
management practices (low earnings quality). The results are consistent with Gul et al. (2003); Baxter et al. 
(2009); and Aerts et al. (2014).  
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For sales growth (SGROWTH), the result shows a significant and positive relationship with DA1.This result is 
consistent with Warfield et al.’s (1995) study which indicates that an increase in sales growth leads to an 
increase in discretionary accruals (low quality of earnings). Previous studies in Malaysia by Abdul Rahman and 
Ali (2006); and Johl et al. (2013) have found apositively insignificant association between sales growth and 
discretionary accruals. However, the sales growth is found to be significant with negative direction with DA2, 
suggesting that an increase in sales leads to a decrease in discretionary accruals (high earnings quality). 
 
Table 7. Multiple regression results 
Variables Predicted Sign DA1 DA2 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Constant ? 0.0913*** 7.39 0.155* 1.87 
BDIND - 0.0241** 2.42 0.292*** 3.96 
ACIND - -0.0189** -2.38 -0.0217 -0.43 
IAF 0.000422 0.33 -0.0296*** -3.3 
OWCO + 0.000215*** 3.05 0.00155*** 3.53 
BIG4 - -0.00525** -2.24 -0.0303* -1.83 
ROA - -0.0473* -1.67 -0.517*** -2.76 
LEV + 0.0216*** 3.42 -0.0756* -1.66 
FSIZE - -0.00403*** -3.4 0.0230*** 2.71 
LOSS + 0.00690* 1.79 0.0560* 1.88 
SGROWTH + 0.0104*** 2.65 -0.0494* -1.81 
R2 0.0609 0.0582 
F-value 11.24 7.51 
Sig 0 0 
N 2032 2032 
Where: *, **, *** Significant level at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. DA1 = Discretionary accruals Modified Jones 
Model (Dechow et al., 1995), DA2 = Modified Jones Model (Yoon et al., 2006), BDIND = board independence, ACIND 
= AC independence, IAF = cost of internal audit function, BIG4 = largest 4 audit firms, OWCO5 = Ownership 
Concentration, ROA = Return on assets, LEV = Leverage, FSIZE = Firm size, LOSS = Net Income Loss, SGROWTH = 
Sales growth. 
 
5.2 Additional Sensitivity Analysis 
Additional analysis were conducted to determine the sensitivity of the results as well as to determine the 
robustness of the findings reported earlier in Table 7. The repeated regression models allowing for a possible 
different relationship between audit committee independence and earnings quality. The study model was further 
tested by creating a new variable of audit committee independence measured by dummy variable“1” if all audit 
committee members are independent and “0” otherwise, rather than percentage of audit committee independence 
to audit committee size. Results in Table 8 show that the coefficients of the relationship between audit 
committee independence and earnings quality are consistent.  
 
Table 8. Multiple regression results 
Variables Predicted DA1 DA2 Sign Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Constant ? 0.0797*** 7.07 0.142* 1.87 
BDIND - 0.0241** 2.44 0.297*** 4.07 
ACIND - -0.00619** -2.51 -0.0105 -0.68 
IAF - 0.000391 0.31 -0.0297*** -3.31 
OWCO + 0.000213*** 3.01 0.00154*** 3.5 
BIG4 - -0.00519** -2.22 -0.0304* -1.83 
ROA - -0.0477* -1.69 -0.516*** -2.76 
LEV + 0.0216*** 3.42 -0.0756* -1.67 
FSIZE - -0.00408*** -3.44 0.0230*** 2.72 
LOSS + 0.00684* 1.78 0.0560* 1.89 
SGROWTH + 0.0104*** 2.66 -0.0492* -1.8 
R2 0.0612 0.0583 
F-value 11.31 7.53 
Sig 0 0 
N 2032 2032 
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Where: *, **, *** Significant level at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. DA1 = Discretionary accruals Modified Jones 
Model (Dechow et al., 1995), DA2 = Modified Jones Model (Yoon et al., 2006), BDIND = board independence, ACIND 
= AC independence, IAF = cost of internal audit function, BIG4 = largest 4 audit firms, OWCO5 = Ownership 
Concentration, ROA = Return on assets, LEV = Leverage, FSIZE = Firm size, LOSS = Net Income Loss, SGROWTH = 
Sales growth. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We examined the effect of board and audit committee independence, quality of internal audit function and 
ownership concentration on earnings quality, measured by absolute value of discretionary accruals. We have 
found some evidence that audit committee independence and more investment in internal audit function related 
to high level of earnings quality. However, the study has found evidence that board independence and ownership 
concentration are associated with low earnings quality. In addition, external audit by Big4 firms also increases 
the level of earnings quality. The findings are consistent for both measures of earnings quality in relation to 
board characteristics. This study contains a number of limitations; first limitation is study sample only Malaysia 
Main Market listed companies. Second limitation is the study covered only four years, Lastly, limitations related 
of other independent variables which may influence on earning quality and internal monitoring mechanisms such 
as other board and audit committee characteristics, ownership structure, because Malaysian companies have high 
ownership concentration that may affect the monitoring function of board and audit committee. We recommend 
that future research should examine other variables of audit committee characteristics (size, independence, 
expertise, etc.) and other ownership structures on the relationship with earnings quality.  
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